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AUTHOR Byrum, C. Stephen
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ABSTRACT

The Greek concept of techne can aid in understanding technological society and the way it can generate a separation of business and personal lives. As used by the early Greeks, techne mean the knowledge required to get the job done. The "manager" of today epitomizes this early concept. He is trained to get the job done efficiently, economically, and rapidly. As a result, management can take on a life of its own and managers can lose touch with their personal values. The Greeks, however, quickly saw the inadequacies of the concept. Obssessed with wholeness and concerned with telos, or the "end" of a matter, they added an ethical and aesthetic dimension to their early definition. Techne came to mean not only understanding how to get the job done but also how the skill could be integrated with being a good citizen. Aristotle further defined techne to include a moral dimension. At each state in the development of the concept from basic know-how to general community implication to specific moral concern, education was of prime importance. Education today, especially the humanities, can play a role in helping our technonological society take on the more humane qualities of the evolved concept of techne. (RM)

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THE GREEK CONCEPT OF TECHNĒ

C. Stephen Byrum, PhD
Assistant Dean of Humanities
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Chattanooga State Technical Community College
4501 Amnicola Highway
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37406

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THE GREEK CONCEPT OF TECHNĒ

by
C. STEPHEN BYRUM

In late 1975 Saturday Review put together a special report entitled "Watergating on Main Street." The magazine was not simply trying to add one more set of articles to that growing list which discussed the "lessons of Watergate," nor was it attempting to create another apochalyptic announcement, because of the events of Watergate, proclaiming the end of our civilization. Our civilization would continue to exist beyond Watergate and its technological parallel, Vietnam, as it has, but Saturday Review was concerned about the humane quality of existence that would continue.

Watergate was seen, not as a moment of grave exception, but an an epitomizing indication of the kind of events that were occuring on "Main Street" every day. Here was Richard Nixon, the bright emissary of the American Way who had carried the message of freedom into "Red" China, the loving father who had waltzed his princess-like daughter through a White House wedding, dirting his hands with small-time hoodlums and sounding, interesting enough, on those damning tapes he had little enough sense not to destroy, like that other major media figure of the Watergate era -- Don Corleone, the Godfather.

How could this be? With Billy Graham standing guard near by? In America -- "my country 'tis of Thee" -- of all places?

It was easy enough to blame Nixon, to see him as some kind of pathological Jekyll and Hyde. To some degree this is Kissinger's retrospective analysis. He says that there were two sides to Nixon's personality. One was contemplative, reflective, humane, and capable of sensitive decisions that

revealed some degree of genius. The other was short-fused, easily intimidated, bullish, and aggressive; capable of brutalizing with the power that was at his disposal. The key, for Kissinger, was to hope that time would allow for the positive, reflective Nixon to censor the bullish, power broker side of his personality.

Nixon's Jekyll and Hyde is seen by Saturday Review as merely representative of the attempt, broadly visible today, of a dichotomizing of human personality between the "business " side of life and the personal "side." We might tithe on Sunday -- that's personal, but we become involved in payoffs and kickbacks on Monday -- that's business. We would never engage in illicit sex with our neighbor's wife -- that's personal, but we could very well surrepticiously "stab our neighbor in the back" over some contract that is being competed for -- that's business. We are the loving husband and father at home -- that's personal, but the resident Romeo and Don Juan at the office or on the road -- that's business. And, we come to the place of seeing or experiencing no conflict!

Abba Eban, the for er foreign minister of Israel who was responsible for helping to guide the Middle East through several crises, is famous for having said: "Men and women tend to behave wisely after having exhausted all alternatives."[1] That may have been true when Egyptian and Israelite war machines lined up against each other or during the Cuban missle crisis, but it was not true for Nixon and it may not be true in many corporate board rooms, executive conference sessions, and other management decision making situations where a "bottom line" ethic of productivity, efficiency, accountability, and demonstrable competency prevails.

> The worst thing that has happened to professionals has been the divorce between their professional and business life and their personal life. It is a fateful dualism, the effort to separate the kind of person I am in my profession from the

> kind of person I am with my children, friends, wife, husband, lover. The most glaring example of this dichotomy will be found in the professional mobster, who kills when he wants to dispose of competitors but is sentimental about his family. It is, in extreme form, what takes place all down the line in the separation of the "profession" from the "personal."[3]

Some would say that what is being described here is simply the "new morality." Others would say that it is merely a manifestation of the cultural relativism of our age. Even the Nixon apologists explained Watergate as a response to seeing the Vietnam activists embrace a situational ethics that was justified by the ends they sought -- the break-in, the dirty tricks campaign, and the other incredulaties were simply an ethics of a slightly different situation designed to accomplish its equally conceived, glorious end.

My contention is that what is being seen in watergating -- the separating of "business" from the "personal" -- whether in the oval office or on Main Street is inadequately defined when seen in terms of the new morality, situation ethics, or some manifestation of general cultural relativism. What is being seen is the triumph of _techne_. If we can come to understand this term, we will have a greater understanding of our so-called technological society and the way that it can generate watergating. We can also be exposed to an understanding of the term that, if it were embraced, could perhaps give us a more humane society. Finally, we can come to reexamine that role which education plays in our contemporary culture.

Early in the Greek experience when education was specifically more than simply that which was picked up by osmosis or trial and error from the general life environment, the educational process was divided into three components: (1) commandments (typically rules that related to religious, governmental, or parental homage); (2) rules of practical wisdom (learned common sense like that found in the Egyptian Widsom of _Amenopet_, the Hebrew _Proverbs_, or even Franklin's _Poor Richard's Almanac_); and, (3) professional skills (the pragmatic

"know how" or techniques necessary to accomplish any task from shoe making to cooking to playing a musical instrument).

This final component of education, the early understanding of professional skill, "know how," or technique the Greeks called techne, and the concept was important to the work of most of the luminaries of early Greek philosophy including Protagorus, Socrates/Plato, and Aristotle. A working definition of techne in its early use -- and I consciously keep emphasizing early -- would be "special knowledge, based on general rules, fixed knowledge, and routine experience, that is basically necessary to livelihood."[4] A modern paraphrase might describe techne as the knowledge required to get the job done. One might add -- again, in the early sense -- that the best techne would be that which got the job done most efficiently, economically, and rapidly.

Even this initial understanding is significant because it allows us to immediately make a needed clarification. In our modern understandings when we see the word techne we are apt to immediately think of technical, technology, technique, and other cognates. (I teach at a technical community college.) This is not a problem because, certainly, these words are all linguistically derived from the Greek root. However, when we think of technical and technology, we almost automatically think about machines.

We probably think that technology is impossible without machines, and that there cannot be a "technological society" until there is first an "industrial revolution." In a minor regard this is true since the carver's knife, the caveman's stone mallet, or even a pounding fist is in principle a machine not unlike a water powered loom or a nuclear reactor.

However, the proliferation of machines that surround our lives can mislead us into assuming that technology is the result of the machine. This may give us an easy scapegoat for avoiding personal responsibilities by encouraging us to blame negative situations on the machine. How many times we hear "if

it weren't for the damned computer!," "it's the system!," "the program just won't allow it!" Or, the inevitable Christmas shopper's delay: "I'm sorry, I can't even take cash -- even if I keep the change -- as long as the computer is down." Or, the somewhat disconcerting cry from behind the panel at the rear of the computer center: "We've got problems back here -- my gang is down again!"

The initial Greek concept clearly states that techne is not the machine or a tool. "Technique is nothing more than means and the ensemble of means."[5] Technique is the entire conceptual, organizational, and manual process that leads to the accomplishment of a task. The machine is only one part of this; the computer will do only what it is programmed to do. "The technical operation includes every operation carried out in accordance with a certain method in order to attain a particular end."[6] Techne is much more the overall method of a task than the machinery that might be used in the task. The initial Greek concept reminds us that even the most sophisticated mechanistic operation (a "mechanistic operation" is a subset of a "technical operation," as "mechanics" is but a subset of "technology," even though many people study "mechanics" thinking that they are studying "technology") is originally and ultimately -- Clarke's "2001 Space Odyssey" notwithstanding -- a manual operation.

Jacques Ellul's now classic The Technological Society paints a vivid portrait of what happens when this early, initial Greek emphasis on the "know how" which it takes to get a job done is carried to an extreme that looses contact with its own greater context and becomes stringently attached to a job-done-for-job-done sake with productivity, accountability, efficiency, and speed being the major considerations.

Ellul has at least some sympathy with Lewis Mumford's fear that man will become a machine (l'homme machine), or at least a Chaplinesque cog. He knows that technology, seen from a purely mechanistic perspective, can take on a

life of its own.

> Technology has become autonomous; it has fashioned an omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which has renounced all traditions. Technique no longer rests on tradition, but rather on previous technical procedures; and its evolution is too rapid, too upsetting, to integrate the old traditions . . . . It is less and less exact to maintain that the user remains for very long in possession of a technique the results of which he can predict; constant invention ceaselessly upset his habits.[7]

However, his key point is not to emphasize unbridled machinery, but to see how technē as methodological procedure takes on a life of its own. Following Arnold Toynbee, Ellul says that the next step beyond the industrial revolution and the technological society is not a Reichian "greening of America" with a counter-culture mellowing and humanizing, but an organizational society in which the man of technē is the organizational man, The Manager.

The Manager of today epitomizes the initial, early concept of technē. He has skill in getting the job done efficiently. He is trained to motivate and manipulate to that end, and his success and ultimate livelihood are dependent upon productivity, accountability, economy, and speed.

Ellul, writing in 1954, was prophetic. Consider the emphasis given to management philosophy and psychology today, the growing number of periodicals and "experts" in the field of motivational management, or the high status accorded systems analysts and management consultants. It is significant that three of the major books in the American marketplace today are John Naisbitt's Megatrends, Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excellence, and (predictably, given the American infatuation with quick cures) Blanchard and Johnson's The One Minute Manager which is subtitled "The Quickest Way to Increase Your Own Prosperity."

Organization and management can take on a life of their own; to use an old expression, "the tail can begin to wag the dog." "Business" becomes divorced from the "personal" -- it is often even encouraged that this occur.

The Manager is often capable of becoming involved in a process that gets beyond his control. He is capable of loosing touch with traditions. His judgements can be pragmatic, efficient, and inclined toward immediately accessible results, and long term, less vividly demonstrable involvements may take on a lesser priority. He may become involved in activities that are not inconsistent with management principles and that give him no problems with the judgements of superiors who are concerned only with his getting the job done, but which destroy his personal life. In fact, his involvement with the organizational, management mentality may be so complete -- he may become so caught up in "business" -- that his actions or loss of feeling for the personal is a difficult-to-understand, confusing, hard-to-control mystery even to him.

Because of the prevalence of this management, organizational mentality, it is of utmost importance to see what the Greeks did with the term <u>technē</u>. They did not rest long with the initial, early understanding, but quickly saw its inadequacies. It is almost as if we stand in the place of needing to desperately relearn what they learned centuries ago. We need the broader understanding of <u>technē</u>, of how to get the job done, that they developed.

The Greeks were obsessed with the ideas of proportion, wholeness, harmony, and equilibrium. They would have seen the specialized dichotomization of contemporary life as spiritually dehumanizing and rationally absurd. They would recognize immediately the danger implicit in the business/personal fragmentation.

> The fact is that a human being cannot be segmented in that way. Everything I do is personal to me, in the sense that it flows out of my personality and character and helps to shape them, too. We have no effective way of compartmentalizing ourselves without <u>confusing our sense of moral direction</u>.[8]

In a sense, this is the tragedy of Richard Nixon as he callously broke

established laws to enhance the chance of carrying out unabridged by criticism from any quarter his international agendas. It is also the tragedy of Vietnam where the priorities of a military-industrial complex took precedence over useless loss of life and consideration of the wishes of an indigenous people. It is a tragedy relived daily in the personal existence of that growing mass of managers caught up in what Toynbee called the "organizational society."

Simple techne as it was initially understood by the Greeks, and as it has been discussed to this point, was not enough; to simply know how to do something, have the tools with which to do it, and the organizational principles to accomplish a task was conceived as being grossly inadequate. The Greeks were also concerned with telos, the "end" of a matter. It made, therefore, a great deal of difference what kind of implications, consequences, and applications any techne would have. (Recall, for example, how in Aristotle's four types of causation that "final cause" was interested in implications, ultimate outcomes, and intrinsic purposes.)

Interestingly enough, this position concerning the telos of techne may have been first advanced by a sophist named Protagorus who gained the deep respect of Socrates himself. Protagorus held the highest view of techne, even going so far as to restate the Prometheus myth to see techne, along with fire, as an exclusive possession of the gods stolen by Prometheus to enhance the life of mankind.

Techne began to be conceived as art rather than science. Science would relate to factual instructions relating to professional skills while techne would now be something more. This "something more" would involve coming to understand how the skill could be integrated with being a good citizen. In fact, beyond local citizenship, Protagorus was concerned to relate skills to the integrated network of the whole cosmos; "cultural education was the center of all human life now indicating that Protagorus' education was frankly

aiming at humanism."[9]

Plato clearly picked up on this added emphasis. In his Gorgias he stated uniquivocally that "technē is that knowledge of the nature of an object, which aims at benefiting man, and which is therefore incomplete until it is put into practice."[10] He refuses to "grant the name of technē to any kind of education which does not teach virtue (arete)."[11] Even though most of his detractors insist that it is impossible to teach virtue, Plato will not withdraw it close association with technē. Now, technē is not simply skill, but that which can provide for a humanistic enhancing of life and "promote comfort and pleasure."[12]

In his Republic, Plato is only marginally concerned with the specific skills of his artisan laborers; this would be technē in the initial sense. He is primarly concerned with the laborers becoming involved in work that is fulfilling, chosen, and an extension of self. When a major segment of a population is involved in unfulfilling, unchosen work, the entire civilization is in jeopardy. Therefore, technē unrelated to a concern with the "personal" is totally unacceptable; if it is not unacceptable, then by its very nature it becomes destructive of the personal.

To the basic idea of education divided into the three parts noted above, the Greeks added the crowning component of culture. An idealistic element for human existence itself is now conceived as all particular ends are now supplemented by the concept of the human telos, "man as he ought to be." Then, a similar ideal is added to objects and processes as now attention must be also given to "the Beautiful" (to kalon) and "the good and the beautiful" (kalokagathia). There is now both an ethical and aesthetic dimension that must be considered in any "know how" or "getting the job done."

This is an excellent idea. To conceive of organizational processes which must also give attention to ethical and aesthetic considerations would be

revolutionary. The only problem, and it became a substantial one, is that concerns about the "beautiful" and the "good" became so abstract that they became divorced from real life and ceased to be taken seriously by the pragmatic mentality. If there is a failure of the philosopher, the artist, or the cultural idealist, this is undoubtedly it. This continues to be the case, to the extent that the philosopher/humanist (that person typically concerned with goodness and beauty) and the organization man/The Manager (that person typically concerned with business and purer technique) have little or nothing in common. An attitude prevails which is perfectly described by Ellul:

> There is the deep conviction that technical problems are the only serious ones. The amused glance people give the philosopher; the lack of interest displayed in metaphysical and theological questions; the rejection of the humanities which comes from the conviction that we are living in a technical age and education must correspond to it; the search for the immediately practical, carrying the implication that history is useless and can serve no practical ends -- all these are symptomatic of that "reasonable" conviction which pervades the social hierarchy and is identical for all social classes. "Only technique is not mere gab." It is positive and brings about real achievements.[13]

Unfortunately, a gravitation to the extremes on both the part of the abstract philosopher/humanist and that of the pragmatic technician has occured. Because of this, the prospect of interjecting the ethical and aesthetic into the pragmatic is not very great.

In fact, when the pragmatic aspect of scientific <u>technē</u> began to dominate and move unilaterally without sufficient concern for <u>telos</u>, <u>kalon</u>, and <u>kalokagathia</u>, the Greeks fear it could become excessive. A process could be underway that they could not control, and self-control (<u>egrateia</u>) was of such importance that much of the pragmatic <u>technē</u> was rejected.

> The rejection of technique was a deliberate, positive activity involving self-mastery, recognition of destiny, and the application of a given concept of life. Only the most modest techniques were permitted -- those which would respond directly to material needs in such a way that these needs did

> not get the upper hand. . . . The great preoccupation of the Greeks was balance, harmony and moderation; hence, they fiercely resisted the unrestrained force inherent in technique, and rejected it because of its potentialities.[14]

The Greek action was unprecedented. To what extent this caused them to no longer be competitive with cultures that embraced the pragmatic, purely scientific aspect may be an important concern for many people. However, the qualitative heights of human existence that the Greeks aspired to has continued to be an example of life at its best for most of Western civilization.

It would appear that the whole matter of technē can now be resolved. As long as there is consideration for the telos of technē, the consequences of the organizational process and any mechanical activities involved with it, the excesses of purely "getting the job done" will be taken care of. With attention to virtue, good citizenship, integration with the entire cosmos, fulfilling work -- in other words, with attention to that which is "benefiting to man" -- technē is protected. With the additional concern for beauty, goodness, and self-control, perhaps only limited and desirable means (technē) would be followed.

However, the teleological qualifier "benefiting to man" can constitute a general outcome that can be used to justify, rationalize, and excuse a variety of means, many of which may be empty of virtue or humanity. Sometimes it is as if some type of moral, "quality points" are accrued by becoming involved in activities that have a positive social end that is beneficial to mankind, and then these can be used to offset individual, unvirtuous moments within the process itself. This may also account for flaws or lapses in personal morality which seem small and insignificant when compared with "all the good that is being accomplished."

Therefore, in the Greek mind, at least as it moved beyond Socrates and Plato to Aristotle, there was the need to move yet one more step in the understanding of technē. In fact, it may be that in making this final step

that it can be argued that Aristotle moves beyond the range of *technē per se*. However, there is little doubt that he intended for *technē* to be embraced by this final assessment. *Technē* was "know how," it was a concern with both a specific and abstract *telos* -- he agreed with Socrates and Plato on this -- but it had to be more. A fine line of distinction is being drawn here, and it is to the credit of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, which is perhaps the single most important philosophical work to appear since Heidegger, that this distinction is clarified.

Aristotle defines *technē* as "action governed by knowledge."[15] It involves skill, art, concern with ends, and concerns with the beautiful and the good. However, every action occurs in a concrete situation of life that is unique in its own right and expotentially gains in uniqueness as unique people are involved in the event.

> A person who knows how to make something knows something good, and he knows it for himself, so that, where there is the possibility of doing so, he is really able to make it. He takes the right material and chooses the right means for the execution. Thus he must know how to apply *in the concrete situation* what has been learned in a general way.[16]

Gadamer says that Aristotle advanced the key idea that there must be "another kind of knowledge that man has of himself in his moral being, a knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge that directs the making of something."[17] This is *phronesis*, self-knowledge that is gained by the high virtue of thoughtful reflection about the uniqueness of one's self. At one and the same time this is the most essential and most difficult-to-attain link in the knowledge "chain" that we have seen the Greeks building. Not only, to echo Socrates and Plato, is the unexamined life not worth living, but it probably is also incapable of generating purposeful actions of genuine worth to both the self and others. (Cp., *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 8, 1141 b3, 1142 a30.)

Finally, *phronesis* is joined with *sunesis* which Aristotle conceived as a

specific understanding that is involved with detailed concern for other people; that is, what has here been called the "personal."

> We are obviously speaking of understanding (sunesis) which, using this kind of judgement, allows us to place ourselves in the concrete situation in which the other person has to act. The question here, then, is not of a general kind of knowledge, but of its specification at a particular moment.[18]

"Real knowledge has to recognize the kairos"[19]; it has to recognize the timing involved, the "timeliness" which is contingent with every action and event. Here, the "personal" totally embraces that which is conceived as "business."

Already it seems that Aristotle is experiencing a bifurcation of human society. On one hand, there are those "who stand apart and uneffected"[20] in a prophylactic coolness that distances them from conscience and morality itself; it is the nature of the game of the modern organizational society. Then, there are those who are "as one united by a specific bond with the other, (who) thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him."[21]

In fact, Aristotle goes so far as to describe a figure that he calls deinos. This is the person who possesses the epitome of technē, at least without Aristotle's final clarifications. He is "able, with remarkable skill, to get the most out of any situation, to seize his advantage everywhere, and find a way out of every situation."[22] Yet, he does not use his skill, his technē, with regard to the "personal." "He exercises his gifts without being led in any way by moral being and hence without inhibitions and without any orientation towards moral ends."[23] Or, at least he exercises his skills so inconsistently that his general integrity is debased and even those very moral and just actions which he does accomplish are done so under a shadow of doubt about his intentions or ultimate motives. The term deinos means "terrible," and when it becomes descriptive of the modern Manager, the Aristotelian technē has been totally perverted.

In conclusion, at each stage in the development of the Greek concept

education is of utmost significance. Education is the specific medium of all of the different dimensions of _techne_ from basic know how to general community implication to specific moral concern. When _techne_ reaches the typical extreme of Aristotle's _deinos_ or The Manager who inhabits Ellul's technological society, it may be in large measure the fault of education. Unfortunately, with a consummate interest in teaching skills, and perhaps a vested interest in survival, education can easily -- and has often easily -- become the servant of perverted or incomplete _techne_. When and if this is the situation, what can education do?

First, education must realize that it is no longer a virgin in this present, technological/organizational world. There may have been a time when the idea that "absence of temptation (being) virtue's strongest ally"[24] worked in education's favor, but that time is not now. Education has become intricately tied to economic development, it has been placed under rigid financial scrutiny -- it has become, particularly in the public sector, very much an organizational, business enterprise. That makes us susceptible to the same kind of dilemmas common to organizational _techne_ found in other environments. Educators are finding that they, too, are not above the moral quagmires and confusions commonly associated with the business world. To model education on business may dangerously enhance the possibility that education will become a pawn of "business" instead of the champion of the "personal."

Second, education must pick up the gauntlet that was originally extended to it of providing, not only the skill component of getting a job done, but also the self-knowledge, reflective thoughtfulness, and moral concern for others in general. Education that is the servant of mankind rather than the servant of accountable, productive, bottom-line "business" will be an integrated combination of _techne_, _telos_, _kalokagathia_, _phronesis_, _sunesis_, and _kairos_.

Each time that the humanities are belittled as insignificant compared to mechanical skills and organizational arts, education's gauntlet of responsibility is shirked. Each time that a human studies course is deleted in favor of a skills course, or each time that the skills course is taught as if its content were in a distant isolation from the "personal," the shirking of this responsibility is exaggerated. And, when educators become organizers and managers, and their personal, public morality falls victim to the environment created by perverted and incomplete techne, the integrity of all knowledge that they convey is compromised.

The Greeks had the right ideas, but while they were laying the foundations of these right ideas, they were creating the possibility of having these ideas taken only in part. In a sense, our modern society has taken these ideas only in part, and is in a certain jeopardy because of it. Our most plausible "out" seems to be an attentiveness to those components that have been disregarded and educational programs devoted to insuring that all components are fully represented in teaching curricula.

My closing comment is from Mortimer Adler's The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto:

> That our technologically advanced industrial society needs technically trained specialists is beyond question. Intense specialization is always necessary for the advancement of learning in all the learned professions, and in diverse fields of science and scholarship. We cannot turn our backs on these essential needs. Nor can we return to an earlier epoch when such intense specialization was not needed. . . . But we can and should do something to mitigate the barbarism of intense specialization, which threatens to be as destructive in its own way as the abandonment of specialization would be. . . . We need specialists for our economic prosperity, for our national welfare and security, for continued progress in all the arts and sciences, and in all fields of scholarship. But for the sake of our cultural traditions, our democratic institutions, and our individual well-being, our specialists must also be generalists; that is, generally educated human beings.[25]

ENDNOTES

[1]Irving R. Kaufman, "Law," in "Watergating on Main Street," Saturday Review Magazine (11/1/75), p. 20.

[2]Max Learner, "The Shame of the Professions," Ibid., p. 10.

[3]Ibid., p. 12.

[4]Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Volume II, p. 129 and Volume III, p. 77.

[5]Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Press, 1967, p. 19.

[6]Ibid. [7]Ibid., p. 14. [8]Learner, op.cit., p. 12.

[9]Jaeger, op.cit., Volume I, p. 300. [10]Ibid., Volume III, p. 21.

[11]Ibid., p. 66. [12]Ibid., p. 67. [13]Ellul, op.cit., pp. 303-304. [14]Ibid., p. 29.

[15]Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. New York: Seabury Press, 1975, p. 281.

[16]Ibid., p. 282. [17]Ibid. [18]Ibid., p. 288.

[19]Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1983, p 121.

[20]Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., p. 288.

[21]Ibid. [22]Ibid. [23]Ibid., p. 289.

[24]Fred Hechinger, "Education," Saturday Review, op.cit., p. 27.

[25]Mortimer Adler, The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto. New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, 1982, pp. 71-72.

Chattanooga State
Technical Community College